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Renewables and Storage in Distribution Systems:
Centralized vs. Decentralized Integration
Liyan Jia and Lang Tong, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—The problem of integrating renewables and storage
into a distribution network is considered under two integration
models: (i) a centralized model involving a retail utility that owns
the integration as part of its portfolio of energy resources, and (ii)
a decentralized model in which each consumer individually owns
and operates the integration and is capable of selling surplus
electricity back to the retailer in a net-metering setting.
The two integration models are analyzed using a Stackelberg
game in which the utility is the leader in setting the retail
price of electricity, and each consumer schedules its demand
by maximizing individual consumer surplus. The solution of the
Stackelberg game defines the Pareto front that characterizes
fundamental tradeoffs between retail profit of the utility and
consumer surplus.
It is shown that, for both integration models, the centralized
integration uniformly improves retail profit. As the level of
integration increases, the proportion of benefits goes to the con-
sumers increases. In contrast, the consumer-based decentralized
integration improves consumer surplus at the expense of retail
profit of the utility. For a profit regulated utility, the consumer-
based integration may lead to smaller consumer surplus than
that when no renewable or storage is integrated at either the
consumer or the retailer end.
Index Terms—Distributed energy resources, microgrid, renew-
able integration home energy storage, dynamic pricing, game
theory in demand response.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power grid is facing an imminent transformation,
perhaps one of the most profound in its 130 years history.
This transformation is brought by disruptive innovations that
challenge basic premises that governs its design and operation.
One of the premises is the long-held axiom that the op-
eration of the grid is governed by the law of instantaneous
balance of generation and consumption. Thus the principle of
operation is to forecast demand accurately, secure inexpensive
generation resources, and procure sufficient reserves to cope
with uncertainties. The resulting approaches, unfortunately,
often result in complex, ad hoc, and costly practices. Indeed,
the requirement of instantaneous power balance is one of the
fundamental barriers to integrating a high level of intermittent
renewables that defy accurate forecast.
The axiom of instantaneous power balance is challenged
by the recent introduction of commercial grade batteries for
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home energy storage. The possibility that energy storage is
omnipresent in the power grid has profound implications:
demand no longer needs to be balanced instantaneously and
volatilities due to renewables drastically smoothed out. A
relevant point of reference is the role of buffer in the Internet.
It is precisely the omnipresence of such memory elements
throughout the Internet that makes it possible to stream high
definition video in real-time over unreliable and stochastic
networking environments.
The other premise called into question is the notion that
the transmission grid is the central artery that delivers power
from generation sites to millions of end users. The architecture
of power delivery is a unidirectional transfer of power from
generators through transmission networks to distribution net-
works and to consumers. Such an operation paradigm requires
over provisioning of generation and transmission capacities to
ensure that extreme demands are met under contingencies. The
cost of over-provision, however, is enormous. The difference
between the high and the low hourly prices over the course of
a typical year can be up to four orders of magnitude [1].
The premise of unidirectional power delivery is also chal-
lenged by the phenomenal growth in photovoltaic (PV) instal-
lations at the consumer end, driven by the precipitous drop of
PV cost and policies that promotes clean energy. A key policy
is the widely adopted net-metering mechanism that effectively
allows the consumer to sell back locally generated surplus
energy at the retail price. As a result, power generated at the
consumer end becomes a potential source of overall power
supply, resulting in a new paradigm of power delivery based
on a bidirectional model where a substantial part of the power
generation may come from the consumer end.
The transformative innovations of large scale PV and stor-
age present new engineering and social economic challenges.
At the core of these challenges is the complex question on
how large scale renewables and storage are integrated into the
overall power delivery. Answers to such questions have sig-
nificant impacts on architectures of control, communications,
and markets for the future power grid.
A. The Death Spiral Hypothesis and Integration Models
The rise of renewable integration by consumers has led to
the so-called death spiral hypothesis for retail utilities [2], [3]:
the decline of consumption due to below-the-meter renewable
generation by consumers triggers an upward pressure on the
rate of electricity and threatens the economic viability of
the retail utility. As a regulated monopoly, the retail utility
ultimately has to raise the rate of electricity, which acceler-
2ates consumer adoptions of distributed generation that further
erodes the revenue of the utility.
Alternative rate structures have already been proposed that
makes connection charges a more significant part of the cost
for the consumers. Such increases erect a seemingly artificial
barrier that inhibits renewable integration. If implemented in-
discriminately, it shifts the cost to those without the capability
of below-the-meter renewable generation.
Insights into the death spiral hypothesis can be gained by
a better understanding of integration models in distribution
systems. To this end, we consider two types of integrations;
one is the below-the-meter integration by consumers, the other
is the above-the-meter integration by the utility∗.
For the utility-based integration, the utility owns the in-
tegration resources†. The operation decisions are centralized
with a global objective, unobservable to the consumers. The
integrator can coordinate resources within its service area,
mitigating uncertainties inherent in renewable integration. We
thus refer this model to as centralized integration.
For the consumer-based integration, consumers own the en-
ergy resources and operate the integration and storage devices.
The integration is therefore decentralized driven by individual
objectives of consumers. In this case, renewable integration
and storage operations are below the meter, unobservable to
the retail utility. We call this model decentralized integration.
It is intuitive that decentralized integration may have adverse
effect on the revenue of the utility. Does it benefit consumers?
The answer may be less obvious and more nuanced. To a
consumer who still relies on the grid to deliver power at
times of shortage, it is not clear whether the benefit of locally
generated renewables offsets the cost increase of electricity
purchased from the retailer. For the centralized integration, it
is not clear whether the utility will share the derived benefit
with consumers such that consumers find it economically
attractive to stay with the utility’s integration model rather
than switching to the consumer-based integration; the latter
creates a drift toward the death spiral.
B. Related work
The literature on renewable integration and storage in dis-
tribution systems is broad and extensive. Here we highlight
some of the relevant literature that focuses on interactions
between consumers and a distribution utility in the presence
of renewable generation and storage in distribution systems.
Hereafter, we use the terms distribution utility and retailer
interchangeably as we consider the retail functionality of the
distribution utility.
Our discussion centers around three broad areas: (i) retail
pricing of electricity; (ii) consumer-retailer interaction with
renewable integration; (iii) consumer-retailer interaction with
storage integration.
1) Retail Pricing and Real-time Price (RTP): The inter-
action between the retailer and consumers is fundamentally
defined through the pricing of consumption. For consumer
∗Here we use utility to include distribution utility as well as energy
aggregators.
†The utility may also contract renewable providers and storage operators.
participation in a smart grid, pricing of electricity that reflects
the overall system demand and supply plays a central role. To
this end, the notion of real-time pricing (RTP) has received
considerable attention since the deregulation of electricity
market. RTP allows the price of electricity to vary with time,
and it has been widely argued that RTP is critical for an
efficient electricity market [4]. It was pointed out in [5] that
RTP brings significant gain in efficiency even if “demand
shows very little elasticity.” When renewable generation is
considered, studies show that RTP can increase the percentage
of load served by renewables even when the demand has low
elasticity [6].
In this paper, we consider a special form of RTP referred to
as day ahead hourly pricing (DAHP). DAHP sets the price
of electricity for retail consumers one day ahead, possibly
in conjunction with the clearing process of the day ahead
wholesale market. The rationale is that DAHP provides a
level of price certainty that allows a consumer to plan her
consumption accordingly. It also avoids potential volatility
and instability when RTP is determined based on the real-
time locational marginal prices (LMP) [7]. DAHP has been
implemented by several utility companies in the U.S. [8].
It is natural to model consumer-retailer interaction in a game
theoretic setting; the retailer sets the price of electricity and
the consumer adjusts the consumption accordingly. This is
the Stackelberg game model adopted in this paper and it has
been used earlier. In particular, the authors of [9] used the
Stackelberg game to develop an adaptive pricing scheme that
maximizes social welfare. The work of Chen et al. [10] and
Li et al. [11] considered the problem of setting retail price of
electricity via distributed social welfare optimization and equi-
librium analysis. These results characterize consumer-retailer
interaction under the setting of social welfare maximization.
They are not adequate for analyzing the consumer-retailer
interaction when their interests are not well aligned.
2) Consumer-retailer interaction with renewable integra-
tion: Renewable integration in distribution systems has pro-
found implications on consumer-retailer interactions; the death
spiral hypothesis discussed earlier is one such example. The
first study of the death spiral hypothesis is by Cai et al. [2].
The empirical study is based on a model that captures the
closed loop dynamics of consumer adoption (at the yearly time
scale). The cost of net-metering and the effect of connection
charge are also considered.
A relevant line of work is pricing of electricity in the
presence of renewables. The authors of [12] considered the
problem of contract design between renewable generators and
energy aggregators who are responsible for a large scale PHEV
charging. The work in [13] shows that, by coupling with
deferrable loads, the costs resulting from stochastic generation
can be significantly mitigated. In [14], [15], a stochastic
optimization framework for retail pricing is formulated that
takes into account uncertainty associated with the wholesale
market and the uncertainty associated with consumer demand.
3) Consumer-retailer interaction with storage integration:
There has been broad interest in the role of storage in
distribution networks, especially when it is coupled with the
charging of electric vehicles. The existing literature focuses
3mostly on the optimal management of storage usage and the
economic benefits of storage. A particularly relevant work is
[16] where the authors pointed out that the presence of storage
may result in gains in consumer surplus, losses in generator
surpluses, and net welfare gain. Incentives for storage usage
by the merchant storage operators, generators, and consumers
and structures of storage ownership are analyzed in [17].
There has been a considerable amount of work on optimal
storage management under various settings. See [18] and
references therein. The problem is in some way similar to
the inventory control problem but has special characteristics
unique to the distribution and consumption of electricity. In
particular, a threshold structure of the optimal policy of storage
operation is obtained and analyzed in [18]. Similar results are
also obtained in [19] under more general pricing and demand
models. The authors of [20] considered the interesting problem
of cooperative or competitive operations between storage and
renewable generations. These existing results, however, do not
address directly the impact of storage on consumer-retailer
interactions, which is the main focus of the current paper.
C. Summary of results and notations
This paper focuses on how economic benefits of renewable
and storage integration are distributed between the utility and
the consumers, and how different integration models affect
such distributions. The analytical framework presented here
was first proposed in [21] and further developed in [22]. The
application of this framework to renewable integration was first
presented in a conference version of the paper [23] and with
additional material added here. The analysis and numerical
results of storage integration under two integration models are
new.
Standard notations are used throughout the paper. We use
x+ to represent max{0, x}, x− to represent max{0,−x}. For
a vector x, xT is its transpose. Here x = (x1, · · · , xN ) is for a
column vector and [x1, · · · , xM ] a row vector. For a random
variable x, x¯∆=E(x) is the expected value.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume that the retail utility participates in a two-
settlement wholesale market as a load serving entity; it submits
bids in the day ahead market that sets the day ahead price,
and it is a price taker in the real-time market. The retailer
determines the day ahead hourly price (DAHP) and makes it
available to the consumer. The consumer adjusts its consump-
tion in real time.
A. Dynamic Pricing
DAHP is defined a 24 dimensional vector pi posted one
day ahead and fixed throughout the day of operation; it is a
generalization of some of the existing pricing schemes: the
uniform pricing is when entries of pi are the same; the critical
peak pricing (CPP) and the time of use (TOU) pricing is when
entries of pi corresponding to the peak hours are different from
those in off-peak hours. The retailer can also index DAHP to
the day ahead prices at the wholesale market. In this paper,
we are interested in optimized DAHP by the retailer under a
general notion of social welfare.
B. Consumer Surplus and Optimal Demand Response
The benefit to consumer is measured by the consumer
surplus (CS) defined by the utility of consumption minus the
cost. We are interested in characterizing the demand function
associated the optimal demand response to DAHP. To this
end, we consider a linear demand model (Theorem 1) that
arises from the thermostatically controlled load (TCL) where
the energy state (temperature) is controlled by thermostatic
controlled heating-ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC)
units.
Empirical study [24] shows that temperature evolution can
be modeled by a discrete-time dynamic equation given by
xt = xt−1 + α(at − xt−1)− βpt + wt,
yt = (xt, at) + vt,
(1)
where xt is the indoor energy state (temperature), at the
outdoor temperature, pt the power drawn by the HVAC unit,
yt the temperature measurement, wt and vt the process and
measurement noise, respectively, that are assumed to be zero
mean and Gaussian.
System parameters α ∈ (0, 1) and β model the insolation
of the building and efficiency of the HVAC unit. The above
equation applies to both heating and cooling scenarios. But
we exclude the scenario that the HVAC does both heating and
cooling during the same day, focusing herein on the cooling
scenario (β > 0) without loss of generality.
Assuming that a consumer’s discomfort level can be mea-
sured by the squared deviation of energy state from her
preferred setting, the CS for consumer k over a period of N
intervals is given by
cs(k)(pi) = −µ(k)
N∑
t=1
(x
(k)
t − θ
(k)
t )
2 − piTp(k), (2)
where pi is the DAHP vector, p(k) the vector of power usage
over N periods, x(k)t and θ
(k)
t are the the actual and desired
energy states, respectively, in interval t, and µ(k) a coefficient
that converts the level of discomfort to some monetary value.
Note that pi should contain prices at the same time scale
as the system dynamics (by duplicating hourly prices). To
simplify notation, we assume that the time t is at the hourly
scale. The results here can be generalized easily. See [22]. Note
also that CS defined here is always negative. It represents the
total equivalent cost ( actual cost plus the cost converted from
discomfort level) each consumer needs to pay over N periods.
Given DAHP pi, the optimal demand response for consumer
k is to maximize its expected CS with respect to the random
noises w and v,
maxp(k) E
{
−µ(k)
∑N
t=1(x
(k)
i − θ
(k)
t )
2 − piTp(k)
}
s.t. x(k)t = x
(k)
t−1 + α
(k)(at − x
(k)
t−1)− β
(k)p
(k)
t + w
(k)
t ,
y
(k)
t = (x
(k)
t , at) + v
(k)
t , (3)
where the expectation is taken over the observation and
process noises. Here we ignore the positivity constraint on
p(k), and assume that the resulting optimal power consumption
is positive. This assumption is reasonable when the DAHP
doesn’t vary too much during a day and µ is large. The
4following theorem gives the aggregated demand function and
the consumer surplus summed over all consumers.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Demand Response [22]): Assume
that the process noise is Gaussian with zero mean for all
consumers. Given DAHP pi, the optimal aggregated residential
real-time demand and the expected total CS are given by,
respectively,
dRT(pi) =
∑
k
p(k) = b −Gpi, (4)
cs(pi) = piTGpi/2− piTb¯+ c, (5)
where matrix G ≥ 0 is deterministic and positive semi-
definite, and it depends only on system parameters and user
preferences. Parameter b is a Gaussian vector independent of
pi, and c is a deterministic constant, also independent of pi.
Hereafter, our analysis is based on the optimal demand
response of the form in (4) and independent of how (4) arises
from the types of demand response applications.
C. Retail Profit
The retail profit (RP) for the utility is the difference between
the revenue from its customers and the cost of power. Let
λ = (λ1, λ2, ..., λT ) be the random vector of wholesale spot
prices of electricity at times of consumption, which represents
the marginal cost of procuring electricity from the wholesale
market. In absence of renewables accessible to the retailer, the
retail profit rp(pi) is given by
rp(pi) = (pi − λ)TdRT, (6)
where dRT and λ are random and pi the decision variable
representing the utility’s action.
As a load serving entity, the utility takes into consideration
its own profit and consumers’ satisfaction. Here we define the
weighted expected social welfare as
swη(pi) = rp(pi) + ηcs(pi), (7)
where the expectation is taken over randomness in the real
time wholesale price of electricity λ and the randomness in
the consumer demand in (4). When η = 0, (7) corresponds
to the profit maximization and η = 1 the social-welfare
maximization.
III. A STACKELBERG GAME MODEL AND ITS SOLUTION
It is natural to model utility-consumer interaction via DAHP
by a Stackelberg game where the utility is the leader and the
consumers are the followers; the action of the leader is to
set DAHP pi one day ahead, and followers respond with real
time consumption. The payoffs for the consumer is cs(pi), and
payoff to the utility is swη(pi).
For a fixed η, the Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained
via backward induction in which the optimal response of a
follower is given in Theorem 1, and the optimal action of the
leader is to set DAHP optimally by
pi∗(η) = argmax {rp(pi) + ηcs(pi)}. (8)
Consumer Surplus (CS)
Retail Profit (RP)
pio
pisw
pir
∆
Fig. 1: CS-RP trade-offs without integration and the Pareto
front. The point associated pisw is the social welfare
optimal tradeoff, pio the profit maximizing tradeoff,
and pir the profit regulated tradeoff associated with
retail profit ∆.
By varying η, we obtain the Pareto front of CS-RP tradeoffs
defined by
P =
{(
cs(pi∗(η)), rp(pi∗(η))
)
: η ∈ [0, 1]
}
, (9)
where each point on the Pareto front represents an optimal CS
vs. RP tradeoff associated with an optimal DAHP pi∗(η) as a
solution of (8). As a function of pi, the weighted social welfare
is given by
swη(pi) = (
η
2
− 1)piTGpi + piT((1− η)b¯ +Gλ¯) + ηc, (10)
from which we obtain the optimal DAHP as
pi∗(η) =
1
2− η
λ¯+
1− η
2− η
G−1b¯, (11)
where the first term depends only on the expected wholesale
price of electricity λ¯. This term shows that the optimal DAHP
follows the average wholesale price. The second term depends
only on the consumer preference and randomness associated
with consumer environments.
Fig 1 illustrates various CS-RP tradeoffs. The shaded area
represents the achievable region of CS-RP pairs by suitably
choices of DAHP, and the boundary of the shaded regions is
the Pareto front of all valid tradeoffs.
Various properties of the achievable region of the CS-
RP tradeoff have been established in [22]. In particular, the
achievable region is convex, and Pareto front concave and
decreasing. A particularly important point on the Pareto front
corresponds to the social welfare optimizing pricing pisw. It
has been shown that pisw = λ¯, and the resulting retail profit
is zero [22], which implies that the social-welfare maximizing
objective is not economically viable for the utility. If the utility
has to operate at some level of retail profit ∆ as a regulated
monopoly, it is to the utility’s interest to maximize consumer
surplus by setting DAHP at pir.
IV. RENEWABLE INTEGRATION
In this section, we discuss how renewable integration
changes the characteristics of the Pareto front of the CS-RP
tradeoff under the centralized and decentralized integration
5Retail 
profit
consumer 
surplus
gain
(a)
with renewable
without renewable
Retail 
profit
consumer 
surplus
Loss
(b)
without renewable
with renewable
Fig. 2: CS-RP tradeoffs with renewable integration: (a)
centralized integration; (b) decentralized integration.
models. We first provide intuitions of these results followed
by detailed analysis.
For the simulations in this section, we used the actual
temperature record in Hartford, CT, from July 1st, 2012 to
July 30th, 2012. The day-head price (used as prediction) and
real-time price (used as realization) were also for the same
period from ISO New England. The HVAC parameters for the
simulation was set as: α = 0.5, β = 0.1, µ = 0.5. The desired
indoor temperature was set to be 18◦C for all hours. The size
of total consumers is 1000.
A. General characteristics and intuitions
A graphical sketch of the main results is shown in Fig. 2
where the left panel compares the Pareto fronts with and
without renewables under the centralized integration, and the
right panel is the comparison under decentralized integration.
a) Centralized integration: For the centralized integra-
tion, as expected, the Pareto front is strictly above that of no
renewable integration, as shown in Fig. 2(a). Note that if the
utility operates at a fixed retail profit as a regulated monopoly,
renewable integration by the utility results in increased con-
sumer surplus.
Our result further quantifies the distribution of benefits
among the utility and the consumers. In particular, we show
in Theorem 2 that, the benefit of renewables goes to the con-
sumers only if the available renewable capacity K exceeds a
certain threshold. As K increases, the benefits from renewable
integration apportioned to consumer increases monotonically.
The intuition behind the threshold behavior is as follows.
When the amount of renewables is small, the utility simply
uses the available renewables to reduce the amount of pur-
chased power from the grid. In this regime, the Pareto front
shifts straightly upward, which means that all benefits goes to
the utility. As the amount of renewable increases, it becomes
necessary that the utility reduces the retail price to stimulate
consumption. Therefore, beyond the threshold, the Pareto front
shifts upright; the utility and the consumer split the profit.
b) Decentralized integration: For the consumer-based
integration, we show in Theorem 3 that the Pareto front with
renewable integration intersects with that when there is no
renewable integration, as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). The intuition
for this behavior comes from examining the points on the
Pareto front corresponding to the social welfare maximizing
price and the retail profit maximizing price.
Consider first the retail profit maximizing point on the
Pareto front. Because the renewable integration is below the
meter, the retailer simply experiences the reduced consump-
tion, and the maximum retail profit decreases. For the social
welfare maximizing point, because the retail profit is zero,
the renewable integration benefits entirely to the consumer.
We thus expect that the new social welfare optimizing price
results in increased consumer surplus. Interpolating the two
points, the corresponding Pareto front must intersect with that
when there is no renewable.
The case of profit regulated utility is particularly interesting.
Depending on the level of regulated retail profit, decentralized
renewable integration by the consumer may lead to reduced
consumer surplus as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). The reason is
that, the renewable integration below the meter reduces the
consumption, which forces the utility to increase the retail
price to cover the loss of revenue. If the energy cost increase
is greater than the utility of consumption, the consumer surplus
is reduced.
B. Analysis of Centralized Renewable Integration
We now analyze the Pareto front when the utility owns and
operates centrally renewable integration. We assume that the
amount of renewable is not large enough to satisfy all demand
of its service area, or equivalently, any excess of renewable is
spilled.
For simplicity, we assume zero cost of using renewable
energy and denote the renewable available for the retailer in
each hour as a random vector q = (q1, ..., q24). The retail
profit after renewable integration then becomes
rp(pi) = piTdRT − λT(dRT − q)+. (12)
The CS-RP region achievable by DAHP will be enlarged by
renewable integration, obviously. What is less obvious is to
what degree renewable benefits consumers. If the Pareto front
in Fig 2(a) moves straight upwards, then the utility captures all
the benefit. If the Pareto front shifts up right, both the utility
and the consumer benefit at perhaps different degrees.
The following theorem characterizes how the benefits are
distributed between the utility and the consumers for deter-
ministic demand function.
Theorem 2 (Centralized Renewable Integration): Assume
that qi are independently distributed over [0,KΓi] and
the demand function associated with the optimal demand
response is deterministic (b = b¯). Let ∆rp(η) and ∆cs(η)
be the increase of retail profit and consumer surplus due to
renewable integration for fixed η, respectively. Then,
1) for all η, ∆rp(η) > 0.
2) There exists a τ such that the consumer surplus improves
only when K > τ . Specifically, ∆cs(η) = 0 for K ≤ τ
and ∆cs(η) > 0 otherwise.
3) The fraction of renewable integration benefit to the
consumers
∆cs(η)
∆cs(η)+∆rp(η) →
1
3−2η as K →∞.
Proof: Without renewable integration, for a particular η, the
first order condition of Eq. (8) gives that the optimal price
pi∗(η) satisfies
(η − 2)Gpi∗(η) + (1− η)b¯ +Gλ¯ = 0.
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Fig. 3: CS-RP Tradeoff: centralized integration of
renewables
Since optimal demand level satisfies d¯(η) = b¯ − Gpi(η), the
previous condition is equivalent to
b¯− (2− η)d¯(η) = Gλ¯.
With renewable integration, the utility optimizes
swη(pi) = pi
Td¯− λ¯TE(d¯− q)+)]
+η(piTGpi/2− piTb¯+ c)
= b¯TG−1d¯− d¯TG−1d¯
−
∑
i
λ¯i
∫ d¯i
0
(d¯i − qi)fi(qi)dqi
+η(d¯TG−1d¯/2− b¯TG−1b¯/2 + c) (13)
where d¯ = b¯ − Gpi and f(q) = (f1(q1), ..., f24(q24)) is the
marginal PDF of the renewables. We can have the first order
condition with respect to the optimal demand level d¯r(η),
which satisfies
b¯− (2− η)d¯r(η) = G(λ¯ ◦ F (d¯r(η))), (14)
where ◦ means the Hadamard product, i .e., piecewise product
of two vectors. F = (F1, ..., F24), where Fi is the marginal
cdf of renewable energy’s distribution at hour i.
If for all i, KΓi ≤ d¯i(η), Fi(d¯i(η)) = 1, we can
see that d¯(η) satisfies the optimal condition (14). Therefore
d¯r(η) = d¯(η), pir(η) = pi(η), the change of consumer surplus
∆cs(η) = 0. Otherwise, if for some i, KΓi > d¯i(η),
Fi(d¯i(η)) < 1. Therefore d¯(η) does not satisfy the optimal
condition (14). Denote d¯r(η) = d¯(η) + Gδ/(2 − η), where
δ = λ¯− λ¯ ◦ F (d¯r(η)) ≥ 0. Then,
∆cs(η) = 12{(d¯r(η))
TG−1d¯r(η)− (d¯(η))
TG−1d¯(η)}
= 12{2δ
Td¯(η) + δTGδ} > 0.
For the retail profit, for all K and η,
∆rp(η) = (piTr(η)d¯r(η)− λ¯T(d¯r(η)− q)+)
−(piT(η)d¯(η) − λ¯Td¯(η))
= (1 − η){(d¯r(η))
TG−1d¯r(η)− (d¯(η))
TG−1d¯(η)}
+ 12K {(d¯r(η))
TΛ¯d¯r(η)} > 0,
where Λ¯ = diag(λ¯1/Γ1, ...λ¯24/Γ24). As K goes
to infinity, d¯r(η) is bounded, ∆rp(η) goes to
(1 − η){(d¯r(η))
TG−1d¯r(η) − (d¯(η))
TG−1d¯(η)}, ∆cs(η)
equals to 12{(d¯r(η))
TG−1d¯r(η) − (d¯(η))
TG−1d¯(η)}, then
∆cs(η)
∆cs(η)+∆rp(η) goes to
1
3−2η . 
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Fig. 4: Fraction of renewable benefit to consumers in
centralized integration
Fig. 3 shows an numerical example when the capacity of
the aggregated renewable is small. In this case, the trade-
off curve goes directly up; all the benefit from renewable
integration goes to the utility side. On the other hand, when
the capacity is large, the trade-off curve goes upright, which
means the renewable integration benefit is shared by the utility
and consumers.
In Fig. 4, we plotted the distribution of renewable integra-
tion benefits with different renewable integration levels. We
can see that as the level of integration (K) increases, the
fraction of benefit to the consumers, ∆cs(η)∆rp(η) , also increases,
converging asymptotically to 13−2η as K increases.
C. Analysis of Decentralized Renewable Integration
In this section, we analyze the scenario that the consumers
have access to renewable energy, modeled as a 24-dimensional
random nonnegative vector, s = (s1, s2, ..., s24) with the mean
s¯. The aggregated demand dRTs is therefore
dRTs = b− s−Gpi. (15)
Here we assume individual consumers can sell surplus power
back to the retailer. But we restrict to the case that the overall
renewable integration level is not high so that the aggregated
demand dRTs ≥ 0 everywhere. Therefore, the utility does not
offer negative prices.
Accordingly, the expected consumer surplus is changed to
css(pi) = cs(pi) + piTs¯, and the retail profit rps(pi) = rp(pi)−
(pi − λ¯)Ts¯. The following theorem characterizes the shape of
the new Pareto front.
Theorem 3 (Decentralized renewable integration): Denote
the social welfare and retail profit maximization prices as pios
and pisws , respectively.
1) Social welfare maximization price for the decentralized
integration is pisws = λ¯ retail profit is rps(λ¯) = 0. The
social welfare maximization point (css(pisws ), rps(pisws ))
is outside the original CS-RP trade-off curve.
2) Maximized retail profit rps(pios)) is smaller than maxi-
mized retail profit without renewable integration.
3) As s¯ increases, the maximized social welfare increases
and the maximized retail profit decreases.
Proof: When η = 1, sws(pi) = sw(pi) + λ¯Ts¯. Therefore,
the social welfare maximization price is still λ¯ and resulted
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Fig. 5: CS-RP trade-off: decentralized renewable
integration.
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Fig. 6: CS-RP trade-off curve comparison with
utility-based and consumer-based renewable
retail profit is 0. Since λ¯Ts¯ > 0, the social welfare max-
imization point, (0, sws(λ¯)), is outside the original CS-RP
trade-off curve without renewable energy. As s¯ increases, the
maximized social welfare also increases.
When η = 0, the payoff function is the retail profit,
rps(pi) = (pi − λ¯)T(b¯− s¯−Gpi). Therefore, the optimal price
is pios = 12 (G
−1b¯ −G−1s¯ + λ¯). The retail profit change with
renewable energy is,
∆rp = rp(pio)− rps(pios) = −
1
2
(G−1b¯− λ)Ts¯.
Since G−1b¯ is the price to make demand equal to zero, G−1b¯−
λ ≥ 0. Therefore, ∆rp < 0. The maximized profit decreases.
Also, we can see that the maximized retail profit decreases
with the increase of renewable energy level s¯. 
Fig. 5 shows numerical results under different integration
levels of renewable. It is apparent that the Pareto fronts at
1MW and 3MW have crossovers with the that associated with
no renewable integration. It is also evident that, as the level of
renewables increases, the maximized retail profit decreases,
the maximized social welfare increases, and the cross point
moves to the right along the original trade-off curve.
We also compared distributed and centralized control of
renewable energy with the same level of integration. As shown
in Fig. 6, the tradeoff curve with utility-based renewable is
completely outside the one with consumer-based integration,
which means that utility-based renewable brings more benefit
to the retail market, in absence of other considerations.
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with storage
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Fig. 7: CS-RP tradeoffs with storage: (a) centralized
integration; (b) decentralized integration.
V. STORAGE INTEGRATION
We now consider storage integration under the centralized
and decentralized integration models. The problem and the
technique of analysis are similar to that used in renewable
integration except that we need to obtain the optimal policy
of storage operation.
For the simulations in this section, we used the same basic
setup as Section IV. For storage, we set the storage size as
10KW for individual houses, initial storage level as 0, all
efficiency coefficient as 0.95 and ramp limit as 5KW.
A. General characteristics and intuitions
As we will show in the following two subsections, the char-
acteristics of centralized and decentralized models for storage,
as shown in Fig. 7, are similar to renewable integration.
For the centralized model, the CS-RP tradeoff region is
enlarged as shown in Fig 7(a). Different from the case in
renewable integration, the Pareto front is shifted strictly up,
indicating that the benefit of storage goes entirely to the utility.
This is due to the fact that, under centralized integration, the
optimal use of storage by the utility is to arbitrage electricity
in the wholesale market, independent of consumer response.
The gain from storage integration all goes to the utility.
For the decentralized integration, as in Fig 7(b), under some
conditions (as shown in Theorem 4), the tradeoff curve inter-
sects with the original one, similar to the case of decentralized
integration of renewables. The reasons behind this is somewhat
different from those in renewable integration, although the
method of analysis is similar. Since the consumers have the
ability to shift their energy usage, they can reduce the payment
by charging during the low price hours and discharging
during the high price hours. Therefore the maximized retail
profit is decreased. On the other hand, in the social welfare
maximization case, the utility passes the distribution cost to
the consumers. In this case, the storage is used to arbitrage
over the cost to increase the social welfare. Therefore, the
new tradeoff curve intersects with the previous one.
B. Analysis of Centralized Storage Integration
Denote the storage level at hour i as Bi, and the energy
charged into the storage as ri (when ri ≤ 0, it means discharg-
ing the storage). To differentiate charging and discharging
scenarios, we use r+i ≥ 0 and r
−
i ≥ 0 to represent the positive
8and negative part of ri, i .e., ri = r+i − r
−
i , respectively. The
dynamics of the battery can be expressed as
Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr
+
i − r
−
i /ρ), (16)
where κ ∈ (0, 1) is the storage efficiency, τ ∈ (0, 1) the
charging efficiency, and ρ ∈ (0, 1) the discharging efficiency.
Retail profit of the utility is the difference between revenue
and cost. For revenue, centralized storage integration does not
affect the optimal demand response by consumers. Therefore,
for fixed DAHP pi, the revenue for the utility is the same
with or without storage integration. On the other hand, storage
integration allows the utility arbitrage over the wholesale
price to reduce cost, thus increasing the overall retail profit.
Formally, the retail profit with centralized storage integration,
rpcs(pi), can be expressed as,
rpcs(pi) =
r+,r−,B
max piTd¯− λ¯T(d¯+ r+ − r−)− ψT+r
+ − ψT−r
−
s.t. d¯ = b¯−Gpi,
Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr
+
i − r
−
i /ρ),
B24 = B0, 0 ≤ Bi ≤ C,
0 ≤ r+i ≤ r
u, 0 ≤ r−i ≤ r
d,
where ψ+ and ψ− are the costs associated charing and
discharging the battery, B0 the initial energy level in the
storage, C the capacity of the battery, ru the charging limit,
and rd the discharging limit.
Notice that both the objectives and constraints can be sepa-
rated for the part with price pi and the part with storage control
policy r, the retail profit with centralized storage, rpcs(pi), can
be expressed as sum of the original retail profit, rp(pi), and
the arbitrage profit Q(λ¯), i .e., rpcs(pi) = rp(pi)+Q(λ¯), where
Q is defined as,
Q(λ¯)
∆
=
r+,r−,B
max −λ¯T(r+ − r−)− ψT+r
+ − ψT−r
−
s.t. Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr+i − r
−
i /ρ),
B24 = B0, 0 ≤ Bi ≤ C,
0 ≤ r+i ≤ r
u, 0 ≤ r−i ≤ r
d.
(17)
Since zero vector is a feasible solution, we have Q(λ¯) ≥ 0.
With the preference weight parameter on consumer surplus
η, the retailer’s payoff function is
rpcs(pi) + ηcs(pi) = rp(pi) + ηcs(pi) +Q(λ¯). (18)
Therefore, for any η, the optimal price for the retailer is the
same as in the case without storage, and the Pareto front is
shifted up by Q(λ¯).
C. Analysis of Decentralized Storage Integration
We now consider decentralized storage integration by con-
sumers. With storage and known DAHP, a consumer can
optimize charging and discharging decisions. We assume that
consumers have the net-metering option that allows them to
sell back surplus energy stored in the battery. But we restrict
to the case that the storage capacity is below the level of
aggregated demand, so that the retail price will always be
positive. We believe that this assumption is reasonable at
current storage integration level.
Using the same notation for storage as in Section V-B,
the optimal demand response problem for the consumers with
decentralized storage is changed to
p,r+,r−,B
max Ew,v{−µ
∑N
t=1(xt − θt)
2 − piT(p+ r+ − r−)
−ψT+r
+ − ψT−r
−}
s.t. xt = xt−1 + α(at − xt−1)− βpt + wt,
yt = (xt, at) + vt,
Bt+1 = κ(Bt + τr
+
t − r
−
t /ρ),
B24 = B0, 0 ≤ Bt ≤ C,
0 ≤ r+t ≤ r
u, 0 ≤ r−t ≤ r
d.
Under the net-metering assumption (see [19] for more
general results), the above optimization can be divided into
two independent sub problems: optimizing demand response
as if storage does not exist and optimizing storage for arbitrage
as if there is no demand. This means that adding storage on
the demand side doesn’t change the original linear relationship
between the actual energy consumption and retail price; the
benefit of storage to the consumer side is in the form of
arbitrage options.
Given the retail price pi, let r(pi) be the optimal charging
vector by solving an equivalent of (17) and obtain Q(pi).
With decentralized storage integration, the consumer surplus is
changed to csds(pi) = cs(pi)+Q(pi), and the retail profit with
consumer-based storage is rpds(pi) = rp(pi)+piTr(pi)−λ¯Tr(pi).
By varying η ∈ [0, 1], maximizing the retail payoff function
will give us the tradeoff curve between CS and RP with
consumer-based decentralized storage. The following theorem
characterizes the shape of the Pareto front of the CS-RP
tradeoffs in the presence of decentralized storage integration.
Theorem 4: Let the social welfare and retail profit maxi-
mization prices with decentralized storage integration be piods
and piswds , respectively.
1) The social welfare maximization price is piswds = λ¯. The
resulting retail profit is rpds(λ¯) = 0. The corresponding
consumer surplus is greater than that in absence of
storage, i.e., csds(piswds ) ≥ cs(pisw).
2) Assume that Q(p˜i) > 3Q(λ¯), where p˜i = G−1b, which is
the cut-off price resulting in zero demand. There exists
a threshold ξ such that, when B ≤ ξ, the maximized
profit is less than that in absence of storage integration,
i.e., rpds(piods)) < rp(pio) .
3) The Pareto front with decentralized integration is always
inside that of the centralized integration with the same
storage parameters.
Proof: When the preference weight factor on consumer
surplus η = 1, the retailer’s payoff function is social welfare.
Notice that
swds(λ¯) = rpds(λ¯) + csds(λ¯) = rp(λ¯) + cs(λ¯) +Q(λ¯)
≥ rp(pi) + cs(pi) − λ¯Tr(pi) − ψT+r+(pi)− ψT−r−(pi)
= rp(pi) + cs(pi) +Q(pi) + piTr(pi) − λ¯Tr(pi),
for any pi, which means that the social welfare maximization
price is λ¯, resulted retail profit is 0, and the maximized social
welfare is increased by Q(λ). Therefore, the social welfare
maximization point is outside the original trade-off curve.
When the preference weight factor η = 0, the retailer’s
payoff function is the retail profit. Without storage, the optimal
9price is pio = (λ¯ + p˜i)/2. With the decentralized consumer-
based storage, the consumer surplus is increased by Q(piods),
while the retail profit is changed by −(piods)Tr(piods)− λ¯Tr(piods).
Also, we denote piods = pio+∆pi. We know Q(pi) is a piecewise
linear function of pi. Therefore,
Q(piods) = Q(p˜i + λ¯/2 + ∆pi),
≥ Q(p˜i)/2−maxpi{−λ¯
Tr(pi)}/2
−maxpi{−(∆pi)
Tr(pi)},
≥ Q(λ¯) + (Q(p˜i)− 3Q(λ¯))/2
−maxpi{−(∆pi)
Tr(pi)}.
(19)
Since Q(p˜i) > 3Q(λ¯)), there exists a threshold ξ s.t. when
the storage size is less than ξ, ∆pi is small enough to make
Q(piods) > Q(λ¯). Therefore, the RP changes,
(piods)
Tr(piods)− λ¯
Tr(piods)
≤ −Q(piods)− ψ
T
+r
+(piods)− ψ
T
−r
−(piods)− λ¯
Tr(piods)
< −Q(λ¯)− ψT+r
+(piods)− ψ
T
−r
−(piods)− λ¯
Tr(piods) ≤ 0.
We have the maximized profit decreased with small storage.
For a particular η ∈ (0, 1), assume the optimal price with
decentralized consumer-based storage is pids(η). We use this
price for the case with centralized utility-based storage. The
change of social welfare is non-negative. The corresponding
point x has decreased consumer surplus and increased retail
profit. Since the slope for that point is −η, all the left points
on the tradeoff curve with decentralized storage have less
social welfare, this point x is outside the trade-off curve with
consumer-based storage. On the other hand, pids(η) is a feasible
price for the case with centralized utility-based storage and the
corresponding point is inside the trade-off curve with utility-
based storage. Therefore, the centralized utility-based storage
results in a trade-off curve completely outside the one with
decentralized consumer-based storage. 
Theorem 4 shows that, under some conditions, maximized
retail profit with decentralized storage decreases while the
maximized social welfare increases, comparing with the case
without storage. Therefore, the new trade-off curve is inside
the original curve on the left side and outside the original curve
on the right side; the two curves will intersect with each other,
similar to decentralized renewable integration.
Since demand level varies across different hours, the cut-
off price p˜i will lead to high arbitrage opportunity. Therefore,
the condition Q(p˜i) > 3Q(λ¯) is reasonable in practice. For
the setup in our following simulation, the arbitrage profit
with cutoff price p˜i is much higher than with wholesale price,
Q(p˜i) > Q(λ¯), i .e., the condition of Theorem 4 is satisfied.
Numerical simulation results are plotted in Fig. 8. For the
decentralized case, we assume 20% of the consumers have the
storage devices. For the centralized model, we assume utility-
based storage has the same size as the aggregated consumer-
based storage to make fair comparison.
Fig. 8 shows that when the retailer has access to the storage
devices, the Pareto front is shifted upward by Q(λ¯) and the
social welfare point becomes economically viable.
On the other hand, as for the consumer-based storage, when
the weight on consumer surplus η = 1, the retail profit remains
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Fig. 8: The Pareto front with storage devices
zero, and the consumer surplus increases by Q(λ¯). When
η = 0, the retailer maximizes its own profit. The leftmost
point on the new Pareto front shows that the consumer surplus
increases while the retail profit decreases at a much faster rate
comparing with the original tradeoff curve. In this case, the
profit maximization point is inside the original Pareto front.
The Pareto front with consumer-based storage crosses with
the original Pareto front. This means that only when the retailer
is operating on the right of the cross point, consumer-based
storage can benefit the retail market. On the contrary, the
Pareto front with utility-based storage is outside the original
Pareto front. Therefore, utility-based storage always benefits
the retail market.
Another conclusion from Theorem 4 is that utility-based
storage results in an enlarged Pareto front comparing with
the trade-off curve with consumer-based storage of the same
size. This conclusion can be also identified from Fig. 8.
Comparing the trade-off curves with utility-based storage and
consumer-based storage, we can see that the former one is
completely outside the latter, which means that having utility-
based storage brings more benefit to the retail market than
consumer-based one, if no other considerations are taken.
Furthermore, for utility-based storage, the optimal DAHP
prices won’t change. While for consumer-based storage, we
plotted the profit maximization prices with different storage
implementation levels as shown in Fig. 9. Due to the arbitrage
opportunity with consumer-based storage, the price becomes
flatter. This shows that only consumer-based storage will
change the consumers’ energy consumption pattern.
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10
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the problem of integrating
renewable and storage in distribution systems. We compare
the centralized integration by the utility and decentralized
integration by consumers. By examining the change of the
optimal CS-RP tradeoffs, we gain insights into how benefits
of integrations are distributed and the effects of integration.
Our analysis suggests that there is potential benefits of
centralized integration by coordinating distributed generation
and storage operation. We should note that the centralized
integration considered here means only that the objective of
integration is global and resources are owned by the operator.
The actual implementation of control and communication
algorithms that facilitate the centralized integration can very
well be implemented locally in a decentralized architecture.
In this paper, we considered a simplified case to draw a
clear contrast on the two types of integration models. To this
end, we have based our analysis on a Stackelberg game model
that assumes complete and perfect information. In practice,
more complicated consumer-utility interactions are likely to
exist, especially when demand models are unknown. It is
possible that decentralized integration may exhibit advantage
over centralized integration. This is an interesting and certainly
more complex situation to investigate separately.
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